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Market Report
Yr
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 10/12/01
Livestock and Products,
 Average Prices for Week Ending
Slaughter Steers, Ch. 204, 1100-1300 lb
  Omaha, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame, 600-650 lb
  Dodge City, KS, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame 600-650 lb,
   Nebraska Auction Wght. Avg . . . . . . . .
Carcass Price, Ch. 1-3, 550-700 lb
  Cent. US, Equiv. Index Value, cwt . . . . .
Hogs, US 1-2, 220-230 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, US 1-2, 40-45 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, hd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vacuum Packed Pork Loins, Wholesale,    
 13-19 lb, 1/4" Trim, Cent. US, cwt . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 115-125 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carcass Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 1-4, 55-65 lb
  FOB Midwest, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$67.43
88.83
99.07
103.92
45.00
34.00
120.60
65.25
153.00
$70.01
96.00
100.99
109.50
46.50
*
118.75
*
122.10
$68.20
87.90
96.01
108.48
38.50
32.00
112.90
*
122.99
Crops,
 Cash Truck Prices for Date Shown
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Kansas City, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.16
1.80
4.38
3.09
1.25
2.90
1.86
4.65
3.54
1.73
2.79
1.78
4.05
3.37
2.06
Hay,
 First Day of Week Pile Prices
Alfalfa, Sm. Square, RFV 150 or better
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Lg. Round, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prairie, Sm. Square, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . .
115.00
67.50
82.50
102.50
65.00
105.00
115.00
77.50
105.00
* No market.
Parallel revolutions in molecular biology and the legal
framework that assigns intellectual property rights (IPRs)
to plant genetic resources have resulted in the emergence of
agricultural biotechnology and the introduction of geneti-
cally modified (GM) products into the food system. IPRs
create economic incentives for research and development by
making the innovator the residual claimant of the benefits
associated with the new technology. 
Whereas IPRs purport to protect intellectual property,
full appropriation of the benefits associated with the
innovation is not a given. Experience from various countries
around the world indicates that IPR enforcement is far from
being perfect and most (if not all) successful innovations
are subject to piracy. This is particularly true in developing
countries where there is a growing opposition to the very
granting of IPRs for agricultural crops. In addition to the
domestic surplus transfers to foreign firms/IPR holders in
the form of monopolistic rents, concerns of developing
countries include environmental safety and food security.
The result is a widespread violation of innovators’ IPRs in
these countries that has become a major international issue. 
The concerns about IPR infringement resulted in the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPs) during the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations. The TRIPs agreement is administered by the
World Trade Organization (WTO), and allows countries
whose innovating firms’ IPRs are being violated to retaliate
and penalize the violating country/enforcer of IPRs under
the GATT. Even though the TRIPs agreement comes into
force fully within the next few years, an agreement on the
magnitude of the fines that can be imposed is yet to be
reached.
While innovators have been active in lobbying for the
effective enforcement of their IPRs, their pricing behavior
reveals a preferential treatment of customers that respect
their IPRs the least. It is usually the case that the prices
charged by multinational firms/IPR holders in markets with
lax enforcement of IPRs, are significantly lower than the
prices charged in markets where IPRs are effectively
enforced. In Argentina for instance, where 50 to 85 percent
of the Roundup Ready soybean seeds grown are either seeds
purchased from the black market (25 to 50 percent) and/or
seeds saved by the farmer from the previous year’s crop (25
to 35 percent), the prices charged by the innovating firm
(Monsanto) are less than half the prices charged to U.S.
soybean producers. This discrepancy has raised concerns by
U.S. producers who feel that they are being penalized for
being “honest.” One of the conclusions of my research is that
they are probably right.
This article discusses the economic causes of IPR
infringement by producers/users of products of biotechnol-
ogy and its consequences for the welfare of the interest
groups, and the pricing and adoption of the new technology.
Specifically, it focuses on the causes and consequences of
unauthorized use by farmers of GM seed that is developed
and produced by a foreign seed company, and is protected
by IPRs (e.g., case of Monsanto in Argentina and most
markets around the world). Although the enforcement of
innovator’s rights is an issue of relevance for most areas
where IPRs are introduced, the focus here is on enforcement
of IPRs in a developing country.
Causes and Consequences of IPR Infringement 
When infringement of IPRs is profitable, farmers’
compliance with the provisions of IPRs is not assured. Given
the possibility of purchasing seeds from the black market at
a lower price and/or using GM seeds harvested from the
previous year’s crop (farmer-saved seeds), producers may
find it economically optimal to utilize the new technology
without paying the fee associated with its use. The farmers’
decision to not comply with the provisions of innovator’s
IPRs as well as the extent of IPR infringement, depend on
the level of IPR enforcement in the developing country. The
less the penalty is for IPR infringement and/or the lower the
probability that the producer will be detected using the GM
seeds illegally, the greater the expected gains from cheating,
and the more extensive the IPR violation is expected to be.
IPR infringement affects the welfare of the interest
groups (producers and innovators), and has important
ramifications for the pricing and adoption of the new
technology in the developing country. Specifically, the
purchase of GM seeds from the black market and the use of
farmer-saved seeds reduce the demand for GM seeds faced
by the innovator. Since IPR infringement reduces the
demand for GM seed in the developing country, it reduces
the price of the new technology and the rents that can be
extracted by the innovator/IPR holder. The greater the extent
of IPR infringement, the lower the innovator’s ability to
obtain value for its biotech traits.
The reduced price of the new technology under imperfect
IPR protection means that while IPR infringement reduces
the rents accruing to the innovator, it increases the welfare
of all biotechnology users in the developing country. An
imperfect IPR enforcement increases the welfare of produc-
ers that use the GM seed illegally, and  it also increases the
welfare of those producers that purchase the GM seed they
use. “Honest” producers benefit due to the lower price
charged by the innovator in the presence of IPR infringe-
ment. In addition, the reduced price of the GM seed and the
economic incentives for illegal use of the new technology
when enforcement of IPRs is imperfect, result in an in-
creased adoption of the GM technology in the developing
country. 
Determinants of IPR Enforcement
Consider the decisions of the developing country’s
government (“domestic government”) that is responsible for
the enforcement of innovator’s IPRs. Since IPR infringement
increases the welfare of domestic producers while reducing
innovator rents, the level of enforcement in the developing
country is determined by the political preferences of the
government. The less importance the domestic government
places on (foreign) innovator rents, and the lower the level of
IPR protection, the lower the innovator’s ability to obtain
value for its biotech traits. 
    Since the level of IPR protection in the developing country
is determined by the political preferences of the domestic
government, the question that naturally arises is what are the
determinants of the weight being placed by the government
on innovator rents. Factors affecting the importance the
domestic government places on innovator rents (and thus its
enforcement policy) include: (1) the political influence of the
innovating firm in the developing country, (2) the bilateral
relationship with, and the fear of retaliation from the country
of origin of the innovating firm, (3) the severity of the
sanctions in case the developing country is successfully
convicted for imperfectly enforcing the innovator’s IPRs, (4)
the conjectures of the domestic government regarding the
effect of its enforcement policy on the future development of
(and domestic access to) new technologies, and (5) the size
of the enforcement costs.
    Obviously, the greater the political influence of the
innovator, and/or the stronger the relationship between the
developing country and the country of origin of the innovat-
ing firm, and/or the greater the likelihood that imperfect IPR
enforcement  will be  detected  and  successfully con-victed,
and/or the greater the severity of potential retaliatory
sanctions, and/or the stronger the belief of the government
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that extensive violation of IPRs will adversely affect the
future development of new technologies (and domestic
producer access to them), and/or the lower are the resource
costs associated with IPR enforcement, the greater is the
level of IPR protection in the developing country.
Enforcement of IPRs and Differential Pricing 
of the New Technology 
Different governments can be expected to have different
attitudes towards innovator rents, and thus, different en-
forcement policies. Since the price of the new technology
falls with the extent of IPR infringement, differences in the
level of IPR protection provide an alternative justification
for (and explanation of) differences in the pricing of the new
technology in different countries around the world – a
strategy adopted by leading innovators in the sector. 
    Consequently, IPR infringement increases the competi-
tiveness of domestic producers that utilize the new technol-
ogy, by placing foreign producers that comply with the
provisions of innovator’s IPRs at a cost disadvantage. The
greater the extent of IPR violation, the lower the price of the
new technology, the greater the cost advantage of domestic
producers relative to producers in countries where IPRs are
more effectively enforced. Lax IPR enforcement can thus be
used strategically by governments aiming at increasing the
competitiveness of their producers in the international arena.
Infringement of IPRs and the TRIPs Agreement
Given the absence of an effective supranational monitor-
ing agency, and the lack of an agreement on the penalties
associated with IPR violation, the benefits from IPR in-
fringement rationalize the lax enforcement and widespread
violation of IPRs in developing countries. In terms of the
TRIPs agreement, it seems to be well understood that the
outcome of the on-going negotiations on the magnitude of
fines for IPR infringement will be critical for the future level
of protection enjoyed by innovators/IPR holders. What needs
to be understood equally well however, is that if IPRs are to
be effectively enforced it is necessary for the TRIPs agree-
ment to go beyond the norms of GATT. 
    Given that developing countries gains from lax IPR
enforcement exceed the innovator’s losses, if the penalties
determined under the TRIPs agreement follow the custom of
retaliatory sanctions under the GATT and reflect losses to
the innovator, they will be proved insufficient in providing
adequate incentives for IPR protection. Unless the WTO
manages through the TRIPs agreement to “exceed its limits”
and establish an effective enforcement mechanism, enforce-
ment of IPRs will remain imperfect and innovators’ ability
to obtain value for their biotech traits will still be limited.
However, given the lack of a precedent and developing
countries opposition to IPRs, an agreement on the establish-
ment of fines that would exceed innovator damages will not
be easy. 
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Note: The article is based on: Giannakas K. “Infringement of
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